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Abstract—In ad hoc networks, due to the lack of a dedicated
network infrastructure, members have to collaborate ones with
the others to support the basic networking functions that allow
them to communicate. The main challenge of this model is
combating the intrinsic selfish behavior of the participants,
which are usually equipped with handheld and mobile devices
with limited resources. In this paper, a forwarding protocol is
presented that stimulates the cooperation through a mechanism
that combines both credit and reputation-based solutions. A mi-
cropayment protocol is used to charge and reward the applier and
forwarders of a transmission respectively. The credits obtained
for collaboration not only are a mean to pay for network services,
but are a symbol of the cooperative range of a node. Using this
information, the presented model benefits most cooperative nodes
with preferential transmission channels and a higher quality of
service. The model is suited for plain and cluster-based ad hoc
networks.
Index Terms—Multihop ad hoc networks, cooperation, for-
warding, payment, clusters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The functioning of an ad hoc network is based on the
supportive contributions of all of its members. Nodes cooperate
to form a communication infrastructure that extends the wire-
less transmission range of every terminal without using any
dedicated network device. To ensure and spur the cooperative
behavior of ad hoc network members, an incentive mechanism
is required that regulates the resources spent and given to the
community.
Protocols to stimulate cooperation can be divided in two
groups: reputation-based and credit-based. The former treat
packet forwarding as an obligation and isolate and punish those
nodes that do not behave as expected, while the latter consider
it as a service that can be valued and charged. For a detailed
comparison of different cooperative protocols we refer to [2]
where the most relevant proposals are summarized.
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Reputation-based schemes define a method for keeping track
of nodes’ actions in order to classify reliable and unreli-
able nodes [3]–[6]. The main problem of this approach is
distinguishing misbehaving nodes from those that can not
retransmit packets due to energy constraints, channel fadings
or simply natural disconnections. The assumption that a node
shall forward always all the packets it receives is too hard
for a network formed of -beyond others- small and handheld
devices. On the other hand, nodes on some strategic points of
the network will have more transmission requests than those
on the periphery, and it will be unfair to punish them if they
can not hold all the transport.
In credit-based schemes, virtual currency is introduced to
stimulate each node to behave cooperatively. Nodes that gen-
erate traffic have to pay to those ones that help forwarding the
data. In this category, a distinction can be done regarding the
nature of the payment: money-based schemes and token-based
schemes.
Money-based schemes [7]–[9] use money as the payment
token. The drawback of that kind of currency models is that the
costs of managing financial information have a considerable
legal and administrative overhead. Furthermore, the minimiza-
tion of selfish nodes is not guaranteed since users without
economical concerns can behave selfishly in the net and pay
whatever is needed to have its packets transmitted.
Token-based schemes generally require the nodes have a
balanced number of packets transmitted and relayed [10], [11].
Nodes increase the number of stored tokens when they forward
packets, and decrease them proportionally to the number of
hops when sending messages. A node shall forward packets
until it earns enough to send its owns, so this kind of protocols
can be sometimes limiting the capacity of the network if the
average token level is too low. On the other hand, if it is too
high, tokens no longer suppose an incentive to cooperate and
the mechanism does not fulfill its purposes any more.
Present research in credit-based mechanisms is basically
focused on how much a node should be paid for forwarding
messages. One research direction is finding a fair incentive
algorithm that rewards the nodes for the resources used in
the forwarding connection [11]–[13]. The circumstances and
resources employed by relying parties (battery level, transmis-
sion energy, position within the network topology, mobility,
bandwidth, ..) are considered to calculate the cost of a certain
path. Although theoretically these kinds of algorithms are very
attractive, they are too complex for mobile ad hoc networks.
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The real cost of a transmission changes for every transferred
packet so the overhead involved for sending a message is
barely affordable. Too hard protocols may provoke a contrary
effect on the nodes, not willing to participate on the network.
In this paper, we present a Forwarding Spurring Protocol
for Multihop Ad Hoc Networks (FURIES), a simple credit-
based scheme that provides incentives to selfish mobile nodes
to cooperate. The proposed protocol seeks to foster the traffic
through a fair protocol, but instead of trying to pay for the
resources spent in a connection, it rewards with a high quality
of service those constant collaborative nodes. The protocol fits
in plain and hierarchical topologies. A model for spurring the
cooperation and improve the data delivery performance in ad
hoc networks is described. An evaluation of the system through
a simulation analysis is also presented.
The contributions of the proposal are the following. In
spite of previous approaches, that try to spur the system
though a payment model that rewards the nodes based on its
utility function, FURIES uses a payment protocol to categorize
nodes’ behavior. Nodes are prone to collaborate in order to
obtain a better quality of service. One of the novelties of this
protocol with respect to the previous ones proposed in the
literature is that introduces an incentive factor to prize the
forwarding of packets of high ranked people. Moreover, an
efficient adaptation of this cooperative encouraging mechanism
for cluster-based ad hoc networks is presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we
introduce the protocol and give an overview of the proposed
architecture. Section III describes the protocol details and
analyzes some interesting aspects to spur traffic in multihop
networks. Section IV presents a forwarding model for cluster-
based ad hoc networks and incorporates the FURIES protocol
in these architectures. Section V evaluates the solution based
on simulation results. Finally, we conclude the paper in section
VI.
II. FURIES GENERAL DESCRIPTION
We present in this section the general description of our
Forwarding Spurring Protocol for Multihop Ad Hoc Networks
(FURIES). FURIES is a credit-based protocol that combines
properties of both credit-based and reputation-based incen-
tive models. On one hand, it uses payment mechanisms to
charge/reward the forwarding of packets through the net. On
the other hand, it manages user reputation status to classify
reliable from unreliable nodes. Packets of both high and low
reputed nodes are prone to be sent, however nodes with higher
reputation take preference to get their data forwarded, i.e. they
favor of a better quality of service.
The interchange currency used in the FURIES payment
protocol is not money but credit to transmit data. The unit
of credit is a token that represents 1 packet of 2346 bytes 1.
Credit tokens exchanged in a transmission session are used to
state the reputation of a user and categorize its involvement in
1This value is the maximum size of an IP packet over a 802.11 [14]
the net. Nodes that generate traffic loose tokens and reputation,
while the ones that forward it, gain them. However, payments
and collections are not balanced. The cost of sending a packet
depends on the hop distance to the destiny. On the other hand,
the reward is based on the credit level of the sender, that
is, its participation status. Thus, nodes earn more credit for
forwarding packets of highly reputed and credited nodes.
A. FURIES Entities
An ad hoc network can be represented by an undirected
graph G = (V,E), where V = {v1, v2, ..., vN} is the set of
vertices of the graph, formed by the nodes in the network,
and E = {e1, e2, ..., eM} is the set of edges which correspond
to the communication links between the nodes. Two nodes vi
and vj are termed neighbors if there is an edge el = (vi, vj)
connecting them in the graph.
In this paper we consider a node vi that wants to connect to
another one who is not in his transmission range, so a multihop
route has to be established. We assume a routing protocol
that provides information of available routes. Opposed to other
credit-based protocols for ad hoc networks, FURIES does not
require that the source node knows the complete path to the
destination but only the hop distance. FURIES will stimulate
the transmission through the discovered routing paths.
Credit-based schemes require the use of tamper-proof hard-
ware or a trusted third party (TTP) to manage the tokens. We
make use of a TTP to securely store the credit account of
nodes and give memory to the system, that is, credit tokens
earned or spent in a session are taken in consideration further
the lifetime of a particular ad hoc network.
FURIES architecture is composed of the following entities:
• Certification Authorities (CA) that issue identity cer-
tificates for the participants of ad hoc networks. The
recognized CAs are the ones accepted in the Internet
Community and that follow some established security
policies.
• Reputation Authority (RpA), a TTP that is used to manage
the users’ credit account. Such information is contained
in a reputation certificate that will be implemented as an
attribute certificate according the standard X.509.
All users in our model are registered in a well known CA
that issues them a certificate which binds their identity with
their public key. With this certificate, users can sign on the
RpA that will manage their credit. The RpA is an independent
entity not related to any specific CA. It can deal with CAs of
different providers as long as it accepts its certification policies.
Moreover, the RpA does not need to be centrally controlled but
can be a distributed entity under the control of a world-wide
community [15], [16].
Reputation certificates are used to classify users and fix
the rewarding tokens of a forwarding. For this reason it
is important that these certificates hold updated information
at any time. Therefore, reputation certificates are short live
certificates, with a validity that we fix in 10 days. It is assumed
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that users that enter an ad hoc network have online connectivity
with the RpA at most 10 days before, and they have had the
opportunity to renew its reputation certificate.
B. Incentive Factor IF
The FURIES protocol introduces an Incentive Factor (IF )
element to prioritize the forwarding of packets from collabo-
rative nodes and thus provide them a good quality of service.
Nodes do not need to pay more to receive a better service,
the incentives a router receive for forwarding a packet are
intrinsically stated in the protocol based on the profile of each
payer.
The incentive factor modulates the credit (cvi) that an inter-
mediate node has to receive for its job such that cvi = IFv0 ·d,
where IFv0 is the incentive factor of the sender node v0, and
d is the number of transmitted packets. We have designed the
incentive factor of a node as a function of the credit it holds
such that it asymptotically tends to 0 when its credit balance
grows in negative values and increases polynomially otherwise.
Since the amount of data transmitted in ad hoc networks can
range from a few Kb when the devices are very small and
limited, up to hundreds of Mb when the net has access to the
Internet, the gradient of the incentive factor function is bigger
for values around 0 (see figure 1(a)). This allows the RpA to
clearly make a distinction between selfish and unselfish nodes.
The IF function on the credit is the following:
IFvi(cvi) = A · abs(cvi)
(signum(cvi )/B)
Through simulations we have heuristically approximated two
values for A and B, resulting in A = 1/2, and B = 10 (see
figure 1(b)).
IFvi(cvi) = 1/2 · abs(cvi)
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Fig. 1. Incentive factor function
The charges and rewards of a transmission are not balanced,
so we have limited the range of the accumulated tokens
to [−109, 109] in order to avoid the saturation of a node
in an extreme position. When the credit rate of a node is
0, its incentive factor is A = 1/2, which is lower than
1. This discourages nodes from indiscriminately registering
themselves with a new identity to reset their record. The neutral
incentive factor (IF = 1), that is, when a forwarder receives
the same amount of tokens for a carried packet that the ones
it would have to pay in case it initiates a transaction, is when
the accumulated credit of a node is 103 packets which is a
little more than 2, 2MBytes of data.
III. FURIES CREDIT-BASED PROTOCOL
FURIES stimulates cooperation through a credit mechanism
that regulates nodes’ transmissions based on their reputation.
In this section we detail such mechanism, that can be divided
in three phases:
• Initialization phase
• Contract establishment and communication, driven by a
micropayment scheme
• Charging and Rewarding phase
A. Initialization
In order to initiate a transmission in a multihop network
a node needs to hold a reputation certificate that states its
forwarding parameters. In particular, the reputation certificate
sets two main attributes:
• Credit (c): Accumulated credit tokens of a node at the
time of certificate generation.
• Incentive Factor (IF ): The result of applying the IF
function (equation 1) over c.
When a node vi first requests a certificate in an RpA it is
issued a certificate with cvi = 0 and IFvi = 1. Its IF will be 1
until the node starts transmitting data or its accumulated credit
is equivalent to an incentive factor greater that 1. We give new
nodes an IF of 1 to not prejudice their first transactions. At
the same time, we spur nodes first to give resources to the net
and then take the profit.
B. Micropayment Scheme
The micropayment scheme we use in this paper is highly
inspired on PayWord [17], a light protocol that allows offline
verification of the payment proofs. The micropayment protocol
is divided in two parts: Contract Establishment and Data
Transmission. Figure 2 depicts all the steps.
Contract Establishment
When node v0 wants to send data to node vn, assuming the
path will go through nodes v1, · · · , vn−1:
1) v0 generates payment tokens in the following way:
Node v0 generates a long fresh chain of paywords
w0, w1, ..., wm by choosing w0 at random and by apply-
ing a hash function h iteratively such that wj = h(wj−1)
for j = 1, 2, · · · ,m, where m is the maximum number
of possible payments during the session.
2) v0 prepares a contract offer. The offer includes the sender
and receiver identifiers, Iv0 , Ivn , the serial number of
the sender reputation certificate, SNv0 , and its validity
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Fig. 2. Micropayment protocol
period Vv0 , the number of hops of the route n and the
top hash chain value wn:
Offer = {Iv0 , Ivn , SNv0 , Vv0 , n, wm}
3) Node v0 sends a forwarding request toward vn that
contains the contract offer and its digital signature of
it, together with its reputation certificate RCertv0 :
Reqv0 = {Offer, Sv0 [Offer], RCertv0}
4) The request is read by intermediate nodes of the path
(v1, · · · , vn−1). If they are not interested in forwarding
the packet because for them the expense is not worth-
while, they send a reject response to v0. Otherwise,
they enclose in the request a signed attachment with
information about its identity.
Reqvi = {Reqvi−1 , Svi [Reqvi−1 ], Ivi},
for i = 1, · · · , n− 1
After forwarding an offer request, a node vi waits
(n − i)·timeout seconds for a response, either positive
or negative, from vi+1. If it not arrives, it sends a break
up chain message to v0.
5) Node vn receives the request of transmission from node
v0 along with the information of the relaying parties vi
for i = 1, · · · , n−1. vn verifies the signatures and checks
that the number of hops stated in the contract offer is at
most n.
6) If all data is correct and node vn accepts the transmission
from A0, it generates a contract with the data of the
received offer and an appendix with the list of recruited
routing nodes, and signs the overall information. It sends
the contract to node v0 using the same bidirectional path
as the one used in the reception.
Repvn = Contr = {Reqvn−1 , Svn [Reqvn−1 ], Ivn}
7) All routing nodes verify the signature of the node v0
in the contract (because it is the one who pays), keep
a copy of it and resend it to the next node in the path
toward v0. Node v0 receives the contract, verifies the
signature of node vn to check it has contacted with the
right destination, and the contract establishment phase
ends.
Data Transmission
At the end of the contract set up phase, data transmission
can be started.
1) If v0 wants to send d packets of data to vn, it will
transmit to v1 the data packets along with a payment
check. The payment check consists of the d next hash
values of the chain. In fact, presenting the highest hash
is enough. For instance, for the first d packets v0 has to
send the chain value wn−d.
info = {packets, wn−d}
2) v1 verifies the payment, checking that wn = hd(wn−d),
where d is obtained from the number of transmitted
packets. v1 keeps a copy of the wn−d value and forwards
the info to the next node. Such operation is performed
at each intermediated node vi, for i = 1, · · · , n− 1.
3) Finally, vn obtains the packet info.
C. Charging and Rewarding Model
Charging and rewarding is performed using a protocol
between the routing nodes involved in the transmission and
the reputation authority, RpA. This phase must be executed
anytime after the data transmission session and within the
validity period of the contract, when the nodes have online
connection with the RpA.
It is important to notice that the possession of a payment
proof by a node vi does not entail that this particular node vi
has forwarded the data, just that it has received it. However, it
is clear that vj for all 0 ≤ j ≤ i−1 indeed forwarded the data
packets. For that reason, when a routing node vi with i 6= n
reports a payment proof to the RpA, it only receives half of
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the full router rate, while the lower nodes of the path can be
completely rewarded.
Only when the destination node of a packet vn sends
payment proofs to the RpA it is evidenced that the data has
been delivered and all intermediate nodes are rewarded. In
order to stimulate destination parties to send the proofs, they
are also rewarded with a rate of 1 credit token per each packet
they demonstrate they have received. The detailed protocol is
the following:
1) When node vi wants to get payed for the forwarding
services, it sends to the RpA the forwarding contract,
Contr, and the payment proof wk, where k = m −
d, being m the maximum number of packets that can
be transmitted within that session, and d the number of
forwarded packets.
2) The RpA verifies that hd(wk) = wm, which ensures that
the payment proof is valid. RpA obtains the value wm
from Contr, where the value is signed by the sender
node v0 and then assumed authentic.
3) Then, the RpA executes the following procedure:
• If no proof wk has been previously presented by any
node, then RpA adds (IFv0 ·d) credit tokens to each
node vj for 1 ≤ j < i and (1/2 · IFv0 · d) tokens to
vi, in case i 6= n. If i = n (i.e. the reporter is the
destination node) then vn is rewarded with d tokens.
In any case, the RpA also deducts (i ·d) tokens from
the credit of node v0.
• If vj , for some 1 ≤ j < i, has already presented
the proof wk to the RpA, then the RpA adds (1/2 ·
IFv0 · d) credit tokens to vj , (IFv0 · d) tokens to
each node vk for j + 1 ≤ k < i and (1/2 · IFv0 · d)
tokens to vi, in case i 6= n. If i = n, then vn is
rewarded with d tokens. In any case, the RpA also
deducts ((i− j) · d) tokens from the credit node v0.
• If vj , for some i < j ≤ n, has already presented the
proof wk to the RpA, then the RpA informs to vi
that it has already been rewarded for such operation.
Since the incentive factor of a node can suffer changes in
short periods of time, the rewarding IFv0 to be used in step 3 is
the one stated in the reputation certificate which serial number
SNv0 appears in the forwarding contract Contr. However,
when the transmission path is short (n < 5), rewarding IFv0
can not exceed 1. This prevents fake nodes to create looping
traffic between them in order to increase their credit. Then,
Rewarding IFv0 =
{
1, if n < 5, IFv0 > 1
IFv0 , otherwise
It has to be noted that the charging and rewarding model
we propose is unbalanced, hence, it faces a problem of credit
saturation when all nodes achieve the maximum credit level.
This congestion leads the system to work as if it was a
plain model that can neither prioritize transmission packets
to provide a quality of service, nor offer any real incentive to
the routing nodes to spur the data forwarding. To avoid such
case, the RpA maintains a sliding window for each node that
inspects the accumulated amount of data forwarded by each
of them during the last 30 days. If the result does not exceed
1% of its forwarding credit, this will be reduced 1% every day
that passes in these conditions.
Figure 3 illustrates the charging and rewarding model with
an example. Nodes only transmit packets from initiators whose
incentive factor is greater than a threshold. Node v0 has
two connection routes to node v5, however, it can not use
the shortest one to send data to v5 because its reputation
value is not high enough to encourage the intermediate nodes
of this path to forward its packets. Nodes in the shortest
path are centrally located in the network, receive a lot of
forwarding requests, and only relay packets of nodes which
are very collaborative and have a high reputation level. As a
result, v0 has to select the longest path for the transmission,
which is more expensive (it costs 5 tokens/packet instead of 3
tokens/packet), but offers the required availability.
IV. INCENTIVES FOR CLUSTER-BASED AD HOC
NETWORKS
As the networks grow in size, they are more difficult to
manage due to the high dynamism of the nodes, which cause
frequent changes in the available routes between peers. Route
discovery and data dissemination protocols based on flooding
incur in sever message overheads when the networks are
unstructured and information has to reach all nodes in a lot
of independent branches.
To overcome these problems networks have to be structured
based on the connectivity properties of their members. In the
1980s was first introduced the idea of creating a virtual back-
bone [18] to provide distributed control in mobile radio net-
works. In virtual backbone architectures, nodes vi are grouped
in a collection of clusters C = {cl1, cl2, ..., cll}, and each
cluster cli has a clusterhead hi responsible for the transmission
arrangement and data forwarding. Clusterheads are connected
with one another directly or by means of clustergateways g, so
that the union of clusterheads and clustergateways constitute a
connected backbone that is used for the network management.
A node vi is a clustergateway if vi ∈ clr ∩ clt, with r 6= t.
Therefore, nodes vi of a clusterbased ad hoc network can
be qualified as clusterheads h, clustergateways g, or cluster
members n, that is V = {H,G,N}, with H = {h1, h2, ..., hl}
the set of clusterheads, G = {g1, g2, ..., gw} the set of
clustergateways, and N = {n1, n2, ..., np} the set of plain
cluster members.
Cluster-based architectures allow that networks appear
smaller and more stable from the point of view of cluster
members because changes in the configuration of a particular
cluster do not affect the network in its entirety. Cluster mem-
bers do not need to manage routing information themselves but
can directly communicate with their clusterhead that gathers
information about the location and available resources of each
node in the cluster. Routing is carried out through the spine
of the network so when a node needs to communicate to a
remote peer, only the clusterheads and clustergateways are
involved in the search of a transmission path. Then, different


















Fig. 3. Illustration of the payment charges
transfer models can be used to encourage the forwarding of
data through that path.
We define two transfer models suited for forwarding proto-
cols that are session based, like FURIES. That is, a channel has
to be set for being able to carry data through it. The proposed
models are the End-to-end Session Model and the Layered
Session Model.
A. End-to-end Session Model
In the End-to-end Session model, the initiator establishes a
transmission channel with the correspondent node that passes
through a set of clusters. In FURIES, establishing a session
means signing a contract between some actors that is the
base of an agreement for carrying the traffic. For each cluster
there are two stipulated nodes involved in the forwarding, the
clusterhead and a clustergateway (see Fig. 4a). A contract is
signed between the initiator, correspondent, and all selected
clusterheads and clustergateways in the path that facilitates
the transmission. If a breakdown occurs, another end-to-end

















Fig. 4. Forwarding models. (a) End-to-end, (b) Layered
Clustering in ad hoc networks is performed when networks
grow in size, so transmission channels in these environments
are usually long. We approximate the duration τk of a link ek
in an ad hoc network by an exponential distribution (equation
2) with an average staying time τk = µ = 1/λ, and the com-
position of an n-hop path P by the joint distribution of all of
them (equation 3). In [19] Sadagopan et al. empirically observe
that the probability distribution function of the duration time
of a multihop path is an exponential function.
fTk(τk) = λ · e
λτk (2)
fP (t) = fT1T2..Tn(τ1, τ2, .., τn) = λ
n · eλ(τ1+τ2+..+τn) (3)
Considering the duration of each link is independent from the
others, the probability that an n-hop path stays active over a
stated time T is:




fP (t) dτ1dτ2..dτn = e
−λTn
Then, the period of time a multihop path is available in
a mobile ad hoc network decreases exponentially with the
number of hops, and the initiator and the corresponding nodes
may be required to reestablish the connection channel between
them using different forwarding peers several times in a
transmission. Setting up new forwarding channels in a single
transmission incurs in relevant overheads of time (delays for
detecting death sessions and establishing new ones), processing
power (execution of the micropayment protocol), bandwidth
(setting up a new session) and energy.
Fig. 5. Probability of path duration in an End-to-end Session Model
Figure 5 compares the probability of a path staying more
than T time for different path lengths. It is worth noting that
while for an intercluster transmission the probability of getting
a path with a minimum duration of µ is approximately 36.8%,
for a communication in which 5 clusters are involved this
probability represents an estimated duration of µ/10.
B. Layered Session Model
In the light of the data presented in the previous part,
we introduce a more flexible forwarding model that does not
require so long and static paths. The initiator node establishes
a virtual forwarding session toward the correspondent that
only involves the end peers and clusterheads. This session is
called virtual because clustergateways, the nodes that link the
clusters, are not included in the contract.
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For their part, clusterheads have to manage the relying
operations inside their particular cluster (intercluster sessions)
and are responsible to constitute connection paths among
themselves using clustergateways so that the transmission from
one cluster to another one is possible.
Since clusterheads can join the traffic of different virtual
sessions into one single intercluster channel between them
and a gateway, these kinds of connections optimize network
resources. On the other hand, two clusters can have different
routes interconnecting them if there are several available
clustergateways. This multipath ensures a better response in
case of faddings, traffic congestion, etc.
The period of time a virtual channel connecting two peers is
available is much longer than the transmission paths created in
the End-to-end Session model. Not only the session involves
less nodes (nearly the half), but the average duration time of
links between clusterheads is longer than between any two
cluster members. This is because the clusterheads of a network
are chosen using election protocols that ensure the suitability
of the picked nodes to cover this position. Apart from taking
into consideration the localization properties of the nodes and
their available resources, the stability and the reliability of their
links is also evaluated.
Fig. 4b shows a Layered Session model. The transmission
contract between node nA and nB , or between node nC and
nD, involves 5 peers instead of the 7 used in the End-to-end
Session. Besides, custerhead h1 sets a contract with h2, and
h2 another one with h3. These clusterheads paths will be used
for carrying packets of both nA to nB and nC to nD channels.
C. FURIES for Cluster-based Ad Hoc Networks
FURIES protocol can work in cluster-based ad hoc net-
works. The protocol fits seamlessly in the End-to-end Ses-
sion Forwarding model, without requiring any change in the
scheme. However, in mobile ad hoc networks it is more
efficient to use the proposed Layered Session Forwarding
model because is more robust provided the dynamic behav-
ior of cluster nodes. Following, we describe the Contract
Establishment process, Data Transmission and Charging and
Rewarding phase for a Layered Session Forwarding model.
Contract Establishment
Ad hoc networks periodically check their configuration and
topology to adapt to the environment. After the clustering
formation process, clusterheads get information of their cluster
members to know if there are nodes that belong to two or
more clusters and thus, can act as clustergateways and extend
the range of the network. If neighboring clusters are found,
clusterheads initiate a contract request process with them in
order to set up a session and procure intercluster commu-
nication. Contract establishment is accomplished using the
FURIES micropayment scheme (see section III-B). Intercluster
session contracts are always two hops long and involve two
clusterheads and a clustergateway.
Then, when a node wants to communicate with another one,
it asks its clusterhead to localize the correspondent and using
the FURIES contract establishment protocol as before, a virtual
session is set up among the initiator, the correspondent, and
clusterhead nodes of the intermediate clusters.
Data Transmission
The initiator node sends data packets to the correspondent
through the virtual transmission path it has established with
clusterheads. Along with data packets, the initiator node sends
payment checks for rewarding the intermediate clusterheads
that help it reaching the correspondent.
The nodes in this path to the correspondent are clusterheads
that are not in the transmission range ones from the others. So,
they have to make use of intercluster channels for providing
the forwarding functions they have accorded with the initiator.
Clusterheads are responsible of intercluster transmissions and
have to pay for the services they command the clustergateways.
For this reason, clusterheads, before forwarding data to the next
hop, have to extract the intercluster payment check they have
received from the previous cluster, and attach a check bounded
with the intercluster session contract they are going to use.
On the other hand, clustergateways receive payment checks
of both virtual and intercluster channels. However, they will
only be able to charge the checks associated to their contract
with the clusterhead.
Charging and Rewarding
The charging and rewarding is performed between the nodes
involved in the transmission and the RpA that manages the
credit bags in a similar way as in plain ad hoc networks.
Whenever the nodes have connectivity to the Authority, they
have to send it the forwarding contract and the payment
checks they have received bounded to that contract. Holding a
payment check does not proof that the node has forwarded
some data, so when a node sends a payment proof to the
Authority, it only receives half of the payment it can get,
while the previous nodes of the same transmission path can
be completely rewarded. At the same time, the initiator node
is charged for the number of intermediate nodes that it can be
assured that have carried the data.
The initiator node of a virtual channel is charged with 2
tokens/packet per each traversed cluster. Note the difference
with payments in plain ad hoc networks, in with the sender
is charged with 1 token/packet per each traversed node. The
rate of 2 tokens/packet is due to the crossing of a cluster
implicates two forwarders, the clusterhead and a clustergate-
way. Clusterheads are rewarded based on the contract with the
initiator, bearing in mind that the IF of that node modulates
the rate of the job, and the higher the reputation of the
initiator, the bigger the revenues for forwarding its packets.
Finally, clustergateways earn tokens from their contract with
clusterheads. However, because the short transmission paths
in which clustergateways are involved, the maximum revenue
they will get is 1 credit per forwarded packet. This is a
FURIES mechanism to avoid the creation of fake looping
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routes between friends inside a network.
Besides, in order to stimulate destination parties to send the
proofs, they are also rewarded with a rate of 1 credit for each
packet they demonstrate they have received.
D. Example
Following, an example of carrying a FURIES transmission
in a cluster-based ad hoc network is presented. The architecture
of the network is shown in Fig. 4b, and a scheme of the
transmission sessions that have to be established is in Fig. 6.
The network is composed of three clusters, each of which
with a clusterhead responsible of routing and transmission
management. These clusterheads set up intercluster channels
between them through the clustergateways they share. This
way, clusterhead h1 establishes two transmission sessions with
h2 through two different clustergateways, and h2 sets up four
channels with h3.
The cluster memeber nA in the network wants to send
some information to member nB . The initiator sets a contract
through clusterheads h1, h2 and h3 to reach the destination.
Once the channel has been established, node nA can start
transmitting data. Table I shows a summary of the payments
and profits nodes receive in this example forwarding session.
Let’s assume nA has an Incentive Factor IF = 1, 4, and
it sends 5 data packets through the channel. Since the path
traverses 3 clusters, node nA has to pay 2 ·n ·d = 2 ·3 ·5 = 30
tokens for the delivery. On the other hand, each clusterhead
in the path earns 1, 4 credit tokens per forwarded packet, that
is, IF · 5 = 1, 4 · 5 = 7 tokens for all the traffic. Finally, the
correspondent node nB also receives 1 token per each data
packet it reports to have received. The reporting of 5 data
packets gives it 5 tokens.
Intercluster transmissions, in their turn, also entail some
payments. Clusterheads h1 and h2 have to pay 5 tokens to their
clustergateways to send data packets to the neighboring cluster.
Clusterhead h1 uses an intercluster session that passes through
clustergateway g12 to reach clusterhead h2, and the path from
h2 to h3 goes by g23. Assuming the IF of clusterheads h1
and h2 is positive, the clustergateways g12 and g23 will earn 1







h1 g12 h2 g23 h3nA nB
Contract
h2
Fig. 6. Session Establishment and Data Transmission
TABLE I
CHARGING AND REWARDING EXAMPLE
Node Payment Profit Total
nA 30 - -30
h1 5 7 2
g12 - 5 5
h2 5 7+5 12
g23 - 5 5
h3 5 7+5 12
nB - 5 5
clusterheads h2 and h3 receive tokens for reporting payment
evidences to the reputation authority. In particular, they earn 5
tokens.
Table I presents a summary of the payments and profits
nodes receive in the above example. It can be observed that
clusterhead h1 is the node that receives less profit for its
job, only 2 tokens. Anyway, this does not put a brake in
the forwarding rate of a network because the first clusterhead
of a path is the manager of the group in which the initiator
belongs, and a clusterhead is interested in giving good services
to its members because they are the ones that will help
it in intercluster operations. Thus, clusterheads, beyond the
motivation of earning tokens for the forwarding, always take a
special consideration for the packets of their cluster members.
If a clusterhead has good collaborators and the cluster is able
to carry traffic from and to other parts of the network, the
clusterhead will be the one that will get the most profits. This
is manifested in the example, clusterheads h2 and h3 earn 12
tokens each one for carrying 5 data packets, which is much
higher than the 5 tokens that an initiator node has to pay for
sending 5 data packets through a single node.
V. EVALUATION
Simulations of FURIES were conducted to evaluate the
general characteristics of the protocol and provide a proof of
concept. We used a self-developed application that considers
network layer factors and allows us to make qualitative ap-
praisals. However, we do not model the problems of physical
and link layers, so that quantitative performances can not be
directly extracted from the tests.
We simulated two different payment models in an un-
structured ad hoc network: a plain payment protocol without
incentives, such as [10] (that is, sending one packet through 3
hops costs 3 credit tokens, and the intermediate nodes get 1
token each one), and the proposed FURIES protocol with the
incentive factor defined in section II-B.
The simulated networks are composed of 100 nodes that
move randomly in a square area of 1000m2. The transmission
range is 70m. Each node starts, on average, 2 transmissions
a day of messages the size of which is uniformly distributed
from 1Kb to 10Mb. The application is run during a simulation
period of a year. 100 simulation runs have been performed.
Table II compares the results of a population attempting
to send data through a multihop network giving the mean
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and variance over 100 simulations. We have modeled the
nodes willingness to forward packets based on their available
resources (i.e. battery level), and the profits they can make for
the action. Relaying parties do not transmit if the battery level
is below 20%. However, our assumption is that between 20%
and 50% they will resend packets if they obtain a credit rate
over the cost price, in particular, a benefit more than 30%.
If the remaining battery is above 50%, nodes will transmit if
the reward is at least the 90% of what they offer. Despite the
battery level, we also assume that nodes with a negative credit
balance will accept any forwarding request. Otherwise, when
the forwarding is rejected, the initiator has to search another
routing path. It tries it up to five times.
First of all, it has to be noted from the first row of Table II,
that the number of accepted transmissions in FURIES is greater
than in the plain payment protocol. This is one of the goals
of incentive protocols, and FURIES achieve it. By offering
appropriate incentives -a good reputation status that, as we
state in the next point, provides a quality of service-, FURIES
can take profit of the maximum forwarding capacity of nodes
and thus improve the overall throughput of the network.
The service of forwarding packets is rewarded with credit
tokens, and the accumulation of tokens increases the reputation
status. The second and third rows of Table II show that in
plain mode the reputation level of nodes which packets are
accepted or rejected is not relevant since its average is the
same as the rest of the population. That is, in spite of its
accumulated tokens, the sending of any node can be blocked.
Nevertheless, in FURIES accepted traffic is from people who
hold a better profile (8% better than the average), and rejected
one is from those nodes that tend to behave more selfishly (its
reputation is 12% worse than the average). Hence connectivity
of cooperative nodes takes priority and such nodes receive a
better quality of service.
FURIES spurs cooperation, but does not enforce it. There
are multiple reasons for which a node can not collaborate in
a determinate moment (lack of resources, bandwidth..). What
is not acceptable is a continuous selfish behavior, and thus is
penalized. Moreover, when users enter in the FURIES system,
they start with a negative reputation level in order to prevent
sybil attacks that cause the unfair exploitation of the system.
In general, the advantage of FURIES in front of other credit
based mechanisms [7]–[9] is that tokens have a double use:
being the exchange currency of the payment protocol and,
moreover, being the hook that attracts nodes to relay packets
of certain nodes. The accumulation of tokens is awarded, and
because tokens can not be obtained by external means, nodes
have to provide resources to the net if they want to benefit of
TABLE II
FORWARDING SIMULATION: PLAIN PROTOCOL VS. FURIES
Plain protocol FURIES
Ratio of accepted transmissions E(X) = 69%, σ2 = 0.95 E(X) = 83%, σ2 = 1.82
Reputation accept vs. average E(X) = 0%, σ2 = 4.64 E(X) = 8%, σ2 = 0.64
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Fig. 7. Forwarding response of an ad hoc network
its services.
The evolution of an ad hoc network depends on the behavior
of each of its members and how they react to the proposed
incentives. We made a simulation of FURIES to analyze the
performance of a network relative to the threshold used to
trigger the forwarding services. We assume nodes always
reject to forward when their battery level is below 20% of
its capacity. Otherwise, they accept the transmission if the
incentive factor of the initiator stated in its reputation certificate
IFv0 , is greater in a certain factor x than its own IF , that is,
IFv0 ≥ IFvi · x, where vi is the forwarding node.
Figure 7 shows the results of the simulation based on param-
eter x, that is, the quotient between the triggering threshold and
the incentive factor of the forwarding node. The background
columns of the figure depict the percentage of packets accepted
to transmit. It is shown that the throughput of the network
is nearly constant whatever the threshold. However, when we
harden the condition and require the IFA0 is equal to the IFAi
of the forwarding node (x = 1), the throughput gets down to
58%. If we would increment the threshold a little more, the
throughput will continue to fall toward 0%.
With this result it may seem that the best x to choose is a
low one. However, for very low values of x we can not offer
quality of service, the probability to get a packet rejected is
hardly the same for all kind of nodes. It is worth noting the
lines in the figure that show the relation between the reputation
level of the nodes which packets are accepted or rejected, and
the average level. The more these lines are separated a better
quality of service is offered because the reputation of a node
most influence the forwarding acceptance decision.
Moreover, the figure depicts with black arrows the credit
storage trend of a group of people whose initial credit level
was 0. It is shown that when x is low, the credit storage of
the group tends to decrease, so in the long run people will not
have credit to transmit.
Therefore, there is a compromise to get the best results.
Setting thresholds with low values increases the performance
at short term but the network gets unhealthy: less credit tokens,
no quality of service, and so, at last, less motivation to do the
forwarding. On the other hand, high thresholds can reduce the
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throughput of the net. Consequently, there is no fixed optimum
threshold, it depends on the resources of the node, its eagerness
to transmit and so the necessity to obtain tokens, etc. The
threshold is a variable that has to be adjusted in every case
to get the expected reactions. However, the adjustment can
be done automatically to meet the requirements of a specific
environment.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented FURIES, a new model
to stimulate cooperation in multihop ad hoc networks. The
novelty of the protocol is using a payment system that is
based in rewards in the form of quality of service, and
not in compensations for the particular efforts and resources
destined to make a transaction work. The majority of the actual
cooperative forwarding protocols uses this second form of
reward, which is very costly in terms from achieving a fair
payment for each node, and does not really suppose a clear
motivation to participate in the network due to its complexity
overcosts.
The FURIES model is light and simple. The charges for
sending a data packet only depends on the length of the
transmission path, while the payment rewards are a function
of the reputation of the sender node. Thus, intermediate nodes
prioritize the forwarding of high reputed users’ data.
Moreover, the solution is scalable to large ad hoc networks
with a layered architecture. We have analyzed the protocol and,
by means of simulation, we have evaluated the functionality of
the system based on the configurable parameters and we have
provided proof of concept.
The results prove that FURIES fulfills its objectives: it
improves the throughput of the network and reinforces a
quality of service for collaborative nodes.
In terms of future work, we plan to study the performance
of the protocol in real environments, evaluate its overhead
in terms of energy consumption and delay, and compare
it quantitatively and qualitatively with other mechanisms of
incentives.
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